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IN THE 
SUPREMF r )Uli: 
C 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM . .VN'PAG a:.„ 
JOAN :ONRAD, s 
Plaintiffs and Respondents , race vn i447C; 
• • " " ) 
DONALD A. MOWER,
 ) 
Defendant and i A p p e l l a n t : -.;'-•-., • • :• • 
B R I E F 0 F A I I : E I I I I I T 
' MATURE OF FEE CASE 
Acti01 is by respondents against appellant for damages on 
contracts to provide and erect a pre-cut home, alleging fraud on 
del endant ' s ; it i 1 :i t j I: ,< : f • i ] f :i ,1 ] J: I: u t < ::« >nt t act, ai id a llegincc and 
praying for punitive damages. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
•^  , ^
 w e r court ( so far as i s pet fci n e n !:: t: :> thiii s appeal ) 
enterec j a c c e n t against appellant in the sum of $8000 damages, 
and $1=00 punitive damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEA L 
Ipp e 1 1 ai i t s e ek s r e v e r s a 1 o f t h e j ud gm e n t and dismissal of 
the complaint, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Judgment in this case was also entered against Glen C. 
Anderson, Jr., in the sum of $8000 damages and" $2500 punitive 
damages; and Anderson also appealed from the judgment. 
On May 10, 1976, defendant Glen C. Anderson, Jr. withdrew 
his appeal and the District Court ordered Anderson's appeal 
dismissed (Record 377). Hence the only appellant remaining in this 
case is Donald A. Mower. 
Appellant Mower did not order the transcript, having 
insufficient funds (Record 369). Defendant Glen C. Anderson, Jr. 
ordered a transcript, but the transcript was never completed and 
appeal was dismissed. Hence, appellant is appealing on the record 
minus the transcript and does not intend to rely on the transcript. 
Appellant Mower's single point on appeal is that the Complaint 
does not state a cause of action as to him and should have been 
dismissed. This point was raised by appellant at every possible 
stage in the proceedings below, as follows: 
On October 3, 1975, appellant moved the Court for Summary 
Judgment and Dismissal of the case on the grounds that "Plaintiffs 
have failed to state a cause of action as to defendant, Donald A. 
Mower" (Record 162). Hearing was had on said motion before District 
Judge Marcellus K. Snow on October 15, 1975. On October 31, 1975, 
the motions were denied (Record 182). 
Trial was set for November 3, 1975. 
-a-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On October 29, 1975, appellant moved the Court for judgment 
on the pleading on the grounds that the complaint did not state 
a cause of action against him. Appellant noticed his motion for 
hearing at the trial date (Record 176)• In Points and Authorities 
in Support of Motion for Judgment on the pleadings, appellant set 
out that he had made a previous Motion to Dismiss before Judge Snow, 
and that said Motion was denied; and cited authorities to the effect 
that the stated Cause of action is a basic effect that could be made 
and renewed at any stage of the case before the trial judge and on 
appeal (Record 177, 181). 
On November 3, 1975, (day of the trial) the trial judge, 
Honorable G. Hal Taylor refused to entertain appellant's motion on 
the grounds that the same motion (in essence) had been made before 
Judge Snow and had been denied; which decision was binding on 
appellant. Later (appellant recalls) there was read into the 
transcript an order denying the motion. 
On November 21, 1975, appellant moved for Judgment not with-
standing the verdict and Motion for new trial based on the grounds 
"that the complaint did not state a cause of action against this 
defendant" (appellant Mower). By minute entry dated December 19, 
1975, Judge Taylor denied this motion (Record 335, 352). 
-3-
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A R G U M E N T 
THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TO APPELLANT 
BECAUSE IT FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HIM 
1. THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT (R. 1-10) 
First Cause of Action: Respondents allege that on May 2, 193, 
they ordered a pre-cut Lindal Cedar Home from Intermountain Cedar 
Homes, Inc. "through its agents Donald A. Mower and Intermountain 
Cedar Homes, Inc." (para. 3, First Cause). The complaint then 
alleges a shortage of delivery, but the only damage alleged is 
against Lindal Cedar Homes, namely, "that the defendant, Lindal 
Cedar Homes, failed to deliver part of the items contracted for 
and, therefore, owes to the plaintiffs a rebate on the purchase 
price in the sum of $2,200.00." (para. 4 First Cause) 
Second Cause of Action: Respondents allege that on June 14, 
1975, plaintiffs contracted with the Intermountain Cedar Homes "by 
and through its agent Donald A. Mower" to construct the home. 
(para. 2, Second Cause). They then allege that Intermountain Ceda 
Homes failed to complete it to the extent of $3,000.00 and pay for 
supplies to the extent of $5,000.00 and therefore, plaintiffs wer 
damaged to the extent of $8,000.00. (our emphasis) 
Third Cause of Action: Respondents allege that appellant 
Mower "as an agent of Intermountain Cedar Homes" represented to 
plaintiffs "that he was an agent and officer of Town & Country 
Building Consultants, Inc." and that the latter corporation would 
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assume th> -fi^r^op": r! % : : : *• * f -• - : ' * • • . • • • ^ . * i 
• : - . « - • - -..< n .v inai u )n t r ac t • par^ , _ , ":-::r^ Cause ' , 
Alcfo a l leged again?/ apoel lanr Movrer v-;-, " a t row* 
. to a;:c.-. .
 t ,y,»u i • MI «.^ r ob l iga ted i t s e l f z<> a s s i s t i r* ". : «** 
Intennountai i Cedar -ones in comoletrin' the contrac t^ ^arn 
Third •. ausf- \»; i i a m l i t ' - - • : - ; . *J eu *-ict *.,.-_ j. * A- • . a l leged 
-
 (
 i j 1 a f , , . , :r : 'aun? t:^:. T i t e rmounta i r "edar Hi T;*---* :. l i a b . * 
: or any an* -11 ac t s perform*-'.-! ;>!" 7own & Coi. * *• '-• * - * .-v..-"..- *. 
Inc . and ani'j < jintCh, ' i -*_... :amages suffered by p i a : - : t : ; : 
Fourth Cause of Action: Respondents & \ 1 *age t nat *efer<- * t 
Anderson, "by and throu; fo its a'jent Donald A, Mower" x rauduiently 
induct-!! I \w plaintiff tu enter into a contract to purchase a Lindal 
Cedar Home and to have Tntermountain Cedar Home? Im: ; "I 'I!'" w i r i '" 
Countrv Buildiny, Cui'i-1 m H the said home The fraud consists of 
allegations to tne effect that defendanr Anci^^^r *^ n i<renf Mowrir 
falsely represented fhf.i * - - ' v. J . c . - the 
iiM^.jri(jlb ordered Iron ..i:,^^* Cedar Homes- s \+ the *- .:r* fonlh he 
constructed in a workman! i w<=> n~.-*•'>-* ^ ^.i ^ -* * "-. *• „ Hl'ial! 
the i oritrac f u 11 11u i i 1* . o * ^  x .., >»•. _op;-»truet xon of 
the homes would be peri^rmec b* conpeterr anc '» , c^n^- -: ~—rsonnel and! 
that the parties involved * -r ii ;i<: - .  - J'i nancia 1.1 y solvent 
,,,ntl tM«? I1 M |T" i orrn said contract" (para, 7 Fourth Cause!11, 
Fifth Cause of Action: Respondents incorporate Him aJlegations 
re fraud of IIH-M^ F-VUM1* h Cause ul ,.O-„;.OP ana allege that defendant 
Mower acted as an agent of defendant Anderson and abetted Anderson 
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in perpetrating the fraud alleged in the Fourth Cause of Action. 
2. THE AUTHORITIES 
As mentioned above, the judgment awarded damages for breach 
of contract and punitive damages. 
The Complaint does not allege a claim against appellant for 
breach of contract, nor does it allege a claim of fraud. 
Further, punitive damages may not be awarded in breach of 
contract actions. 
Respecting the allegations against appellant re contract, 
iii 3 Am. Jur. 2d Title Agency, p. 564, Section 294, citing nuunerous 
authorities, it is stated: 
"294. Liability on authorized contracts, generally. 
f,If a contract is made with a known agent acting 
within the scope of his authority for a disclosed prin-
cipal, the contract is that of the principal alone and 
the agent cannot be held liable thereon, unless credit 
has been given expressly and exclusively to the agent 
and it appears that it was clearly his intention to 
assume the obligation as a personal liability and that 
he has been informed that credit has been extended to 
him alone." 
The court will notice that there is no allegation that credi 
was given expressly or exclusively to appellant Mower and that it 
was his intention to personally assume the obligation as a persona 
responsibility. 
The allegations in the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action 
attempting to allege an action in fraud are woefully insufficient 
-6-
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so do* In 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Title: Fraud and Deceit, Section 60, p. 922, 
it is stated: 
"60. Generally; rule of nonliability. 
"It is a general rule that fraud cannot be 
predicated upon statements which are promissory 
in their nature at the time they are made and 
which relate to future actions or conduct. Thus, 
fraud cannot be predicated upon the mere non-
performance of a promise or contractual obligation 
or upon failure to fulfill an agreement to do something 
at a future time, or to make good subsequent conditions 
which have been assured. Such nonperformance alone has 
frequently been held not even to constitute evidence 
of fraud." 
Further, Rule 9(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides "that 
the circumstances constituting a fraud shall be stated with 
IWtVcHUvi 
" In checking citations under the identical Rule of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we find cases dealing precisely 
with respondents1 allegations of fraud. 
In Perma Research and Development Company v. The Singer 
Company, 410 Federal Reporter, 2d 572 (1969) the Court ruled: 
"Allegation that contract was procured by fraud 
and misrepresentation on part of defendant and its 
agents as to its intentions and ability to market 
product was by itself plainly insufficient to state 
a claim for fraud. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 9(b), 
28 U.S.C.A." 
In Ivey v. Housing Foundation of America, 73 F. Supp. 201, 
(1947) the Court ruled: 
"A complaint alleging that plaintiffs, relying 
on defendant corporation's representations, paid 
specified sum for contract giving plaintiffs right 
to act as distributors of corporation's prefabri-
cated houses, and that such corporation falsely 
-7-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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represented to plaintiffs that it was able to fulfill 
its undertakings to manufacture and deliver such 
houses, was insufficient to state cause of action for 
fraud." 
Further: When contracts are involved and fraud is claimed, 
the party claiming fraud has alternative remedies; namely, sue on 
the contract £r the fraud. The remedies are mutually inconsistent 
and a election of remedies must be made. See 37 Am. Jur. 2d Title 
Fraud and Deceit Sec. 327-328. 
It follows, as is stated in White v. Venkowski, 37 Wis. 2d 
285, 155 NW 2d 74 (1967): 
"Pursuasive authority from other jurisdictions 
supports the proposition (without exception) that 
punitive damages are not available in breach of 
contract actions. This is true even if the breach 
as in the instant case is willful." 
The failure to state a cause of action is a basic defect. 
It can be made and renewed at any stage of the case, before the 
trial judge and even on appeal. 
In 27 C. J. S. Title: Dismissal & Non-Suit, Section 68, p. 455 
it is stated: 
"A Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that no 
cause of action is set forth may be made at any 
time before verdict." 
In 27 C.J.S. , Section 70r, p. 460, it states: 
"Renewal of Motion: When it does not clearly 
appear why the first motion was not allowed it is 
no reason why the motion should not be presented 
again. It is also been held that such a motion may 
be renewed on appeal." 
-8-
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In Industrial Commission v. Superior Court, 5 Ariz. App. 100 
423 P. 2d 375 (1967) the court ruled: 
"Denial of motion to dismiss where no cause of 
action exists constitutes an assumption of judicial 
power not granted by law." 
I n
 Denver Elec. & Neon Serv. Corp. v. Gerald A. Phipps, Inc. 
(Colo.) 354 P. 2d 618 (1960) the court ruled: 
"Trial Courtfs order denying motion to dismiss 
certain claims in complaint was subject to modifi-
cation, and trial court, acting through another 
judge, could entertain and grant the motion to 
dismiss despite the previous denial of the motion." 
See also Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch 
Reservoir, 21 Wyo 204, 131 P. 43 (1913) where the court ruled that 
objection of a complaint to state a cause of action "may be made 
for the first time on appeal." 
It is respectfully submitted that the Lower Court's failure 
to dismiss the complaint as to appellant was error and its judgment 
against appellant should be reversed. 
Dated: July 23, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M£A V^SaZ/jO/m 
Attorney for Appellant 
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